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EXPORTS AND ANTITRUST:
MUST COMPETITION STOP AT THE WATER'S EDGE?
Dudley H. Chapman*
The ground rules governing competition in international trade rank
high among current issues of economic policy. The President's pending
Trade Bill' and its companion bill on competitive practices 2 place a
new emphasis on issues of unfair competition. These issues were
prominent during the early 1900's and the interwar years but have
rested in abeyance through the long post-war transition. The economic
predominence of the United States characterized the post-war period.
Now that Europe and Japan are once again formidable competitors in
the world marketplace, the rules governing competition on the
international level have regained their prior importance. As may be
expected, the laws that were framed to deal with these problems a half
century ago are the subject of renewed attention and proposals for
legislative change. 3 One much discussed candidate for change is the
Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act of 1918. That law, which exempts
United States export trade from the antitrust laws, was framed at a
time when the American antitrust philosophy was largely unique in
the world. That circumstance has changed radically since World War
II. The time may be at hand to reexamine the Webb Act's exemptive
approach to the enforcement of competition in international trade.
Either a return to the rule of reason or an administrative scheme for
limited exceptions, comparable to that of the European Economic
Community, would seem preferable to the legal vacuum created by
the Webb Act.
*Assistent Chief, Foreign Commerce Section of the Antitrust Division, United
States Department of Justice; Formerly Assistant Counsel, Cabinet Task Force on
Oil Import Control (1970). The views expressed herein are those of Mr. Chapman
and are not intended to reflect the official position of any agency of the United
States Government.
1. H.R. 6767, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
2. The bill, which had not yet been introduced at this writing, is entitled: "A
Bill [t] o amend the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Export Trade Act as
amended to deal with unfair competition in imports, to provide for clarification
of law, for prior Federal Trade Commission clearance of export trade associations,
and for other purposes." 608 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. F-1
(1973). See note 144 infra.
3. In addition to the Administration's bill (supra note 2), see S. 2754, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); S. 1483, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See note 143 infra.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1970).
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I. INTRODUCTION

A.

The SpreadingCompetitive Norm

At the end of World War II, the United States and Canada were
almost alone in having antitrust legislation in the modem sense of that
term.' The ensuing worldwide explosion of antitrust legislation has
been widely documented.' The laws imposed by fiat of the United
States during the occupation regimes in Germany and Japan1 were the
first instances of the proliferation of antitrust legislation. Although the
purpose in each case was primarily political, rather than economic, 8
and although both nations since have made some departures from the
occupation legislation, each has retained a positive legislative antitrust
policy.9 The German law, through successive amendments, has been
strengthened until it is generally recognized, with that of the United

5. Friedmann, Antitrust Law and Joint International Business Ventures in
Economically Underdeveloped Countries, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 780, 781-82
(1960). Other countries, notably Scandinavia, had antitrust laws-or more
accurately, laws against certain abusive practices-at that time. See C. EDWARDS,
CONTROL OF CARTELS AND MONOPOLIES 3-4 (1967); OECD, MARKET
POWER AND THE LAW

6. C.

13 (1970).

EDWARDS, CONTROL OF CARTELS AND MONOPOLIES

(1966); 1-3

EDWARDS, TRADE REGULATIONS OVERSEAS

(1967); C.

THE EUROPEAN

COMMON MARKET ANTITRUST PROJECT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

MARKET NATIONS

BUSINESS REGULATION

EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET ANTITRUST
COMMITTEE
THE

BAR

IN

THE COMMON

(H. Blake ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as H. Blake]; 4

THE

PROJECT OF THE SPECIAL

ON THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET ASSOCIATION OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMON MARKET AND

OF

(J. Rahl ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as J. Rahl]; E.
JAPAN (1970); H. IYORI, ANTIMONOPOLY
LEGLISATION IN JAPAN 9 (1969); Hearings pursuant to S. Res. 40 Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1965); SENATE SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST AND
AMERICAN
HADLEY,

ANTITRUST

ANTITRUST

MONOPOLY,

IN

88TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON ANTITRUST DEVELOP-

(Comm. Print Pursuant to S.
Res. 262 1964).
7. E. HADLEY, supra note 6, at 439; Riesenfeld, The Protection of
MENTS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET

Competition, in

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE

IN

THE EUROPEAN

COMMON

A LEGAL PROFILE 215 (E. Stein & T. Nicholson eds. 1960).
8. See note 7 supra.
9. See generally 3 H. Blake, supra note 6; E. HADLEY, supra note 6.
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Kingdom, as one of the two strongest laws outside of the Western
Hemisphere.1"
The British law itself is a major benchmark." Starting from scratch
after World War II, and following two decades characterized by a
wholesale renunciation of competition in favor of industrial cooperation and cartelization,' 2 the United Kingdom achieved a clear shift in
its antitrust policy, principally in the Restrictive Trade Practices Act
of 1956. A comparable change has occurred throughout the nonsocialist countries and, to some extent, even in the citadels of centrally
planned socialist economies. 3
The growth of foreign antitrust legislation reflected a watershed in
political-economic attitudes. The interwar years in Europe had been
characterized by a virtual abandonment of competition as a regulator
of markets in favor of cartelization (both private and with government
collaboration); cartels were deemed necessary to "rationalize" industry and avoid wasteful competition.' 4 Germany was the forerunner
in this movement, with literally hundreds of cartels permeating its
economy.'" The United Kingdom started from the opposite extreme
of laissez faire liberalism in the 19th century, but rapidly crossed over
to a policy of cartelization to which it adhered until the outbreak of
World War 1I.16
Corwin Edwards attributes the postwar trend among nations away
from cartelization policies to a number of factors, including revulsion
against the association of powerful cartels with the fascist dictatorships in Germany and Japan, the impressive example of American
productivity during World War II (which our government attributed to
the role of competition in the American economy), and a belief that
the extensive cartel practices of the interwar period were largely
responsible for inefficiencies in their own economies. 7 The active
10. See Timberg, European and American Antitrust Laws-A Comparison, 7
BULL. 131-32 (1962); Timberg, Conflict and Growth in the
Internationaland Comparative Law of Antitrust, 4 A.B.A. SECT. INT. & COMP.
ANTITRUST

L. BULL., July, 1960, at 20, 23.
11. See generally Rhinelander, British Antitrust Laws, 40 ANTITRUST L. J.
827 (1971); Timberg, Conflict and Growth in the Internationaland Comparative
Law of Antitrust, 4 A.B.A. SECT. INT. & COMP. L. BULL., July, 1960, at 20, 23.
12. G. STOCKING & M. WATKINS, CARTELS OR COMPETITION 18-19

(1948).
13. See S. PISAR, COEXISTENCE AND COMMERCE 23-28 (1970).
14. See G. STOCKING & M. WATKINS, supra note 12, at 29, 32-34 & 54.
15. Id. at 19-29.
16. Id. at 18-19, 54 & 60-63.
17. C. EDWARDS, CONTROL OF CARTELS AND MONOPOLIES 8-13

(1967).
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policy of the United States Government immediately after World War
H in urging other countries to adopt procompetitive policies, both for
political and trade purposes, had some effect, if only as a catalyst, in
triggering the post-War surge of antitrust legislation. 8
Another major factor was the desire for economic and political
unity in Europe. The framers of the European Communities were
aware that the removal of government barriers to trade as a stimulus
to the integration of their economies could be frustrated by private

agreements restricting trade along national lines,19 and there was
ample pre-War experience to justify these fears.2 0 The competition
rules and policies adopted for this purpose gave a regional and
common framework to the development of antitrust rules. The

growing vigor of the European Economic Community's competition
policy is now a leading influence in the continuing growth of antitrust
regulation abroad.2
Perhaps the most significant fact about this foreign trend is that it
represents a shift in political and economic attitudes. As described by
Professor Edwards:
At the close of the war, it seemed possible that the trend in Western Europe
and elsewhere would be toward nationalization of industry, central
economic planning, and state trading. But this prospect soon changed. On
the one hand, the communism of countries beyond the iron curtain was
discredited as its inconsistency with democratic freedoms became manifest.
On the other hand, the democratic socialism of Western Europe no longer
seemed, even to socialists, a possible panacea.... It was evident that in
democratic countries large parts of the economy would be privately
administered through market mechanisms, whether or not governments
were socialist. Private restrictions could no longer be regarded as transitional
phenomena, conducive to socialism and shortly to be terminated thereby.
Desiring to minimize restrictions in sectors of the economy that might be
enduringly private, socialists showed new sympathy for competition....
Policies based upon competition tended to occupy a middleground between
extremes of collectivization and cartelization. They became politically
viable and sometimes even expedient?22

18. Id. at 11; Timberg, European and American Antitrust Laws-A ComANTITRUST BULL. 131, 133 (1962).
19. See, e.g., Riesenfeld, supra note 7, at 204-05; 4 J. Rahl, supra note 6, at
23.
20. See note 16 supra.
21. See COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, FIRST REPORT ON
COMPETITION POLIcY 24-39 (1972).
22. C. EDWARDS, supra note 17, at 12.

parison, 7

Spring, 1973

EXPORTS AND ANTITRUST

These foreign developments thus have acquired a momentum of
their own, and continue to thrive long after the post-War missionary
efforts of the United States diminished. Indeed they have not been
pale reflections of American law but emerged as truly indigenous
products reflecting varying national concerns. The framers of the
foreign laws have drawn freely from the American experience, not
copying it, but learning from it, occasionally profiting from our
mistakes and oversights, and adapting American experiences to their
local needs.2" This process has been facilitated, beginning in 1960,
through the mechanism of the Restrictive Business Practices Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), which provides a forum for the interchange of ideas between
antitrust officials of the major trading countries of Europe, the United
States, Canada and Japan.
In some respects, foreign laws are more rigorous than our own: in
imposing an affirmative duty on dominant firms to sell to independent
competitors;'
in a more restrictive policy towards resale price
maintenance 2
in the establishment of more flexible standards
defining competitive objectives;2 6 and in enforcing more meaningful
fines for violations.Y In other respects, notably mergers,2
and
through greater tolerance for exceptions for practices governed by per
se rules in the United States,2" foreign laws are less strict than
American counterparts.
The foreign laws do not reflect the political, populist reaction to an
excessive concentration of economic power that inspired the Sherman
Act. 0 They are based rather on a new-found economic belief that
competition is conducive to efficiency. 3 This does not lead foreign
23. See generally note 6 supra; Timberg, note 18 supra.
24. See 4 J. Rahl, supra note 6, at 203; Timberg, supra note 18, at 139.
25. 4 J. Rahl supra note 6, at 207; Tlmberg, supra note 18, at 133-34.
26. In Japan, for example, a cut-off of supplies to a price-cutting retailer has
been found illegal under the broad test that it affected a "substantial restraint of
competition," without the need to find any combination or agreement, as would
be required under American law. See Ariga & Rieke, The Antimonopoly Law of
Japan and its Enforcement, 39 WASH. L. REV. 437,447 (1964).
27. In contrast to the Sherman Act's $50,000 limit (15 U.S.C. § § 1, 2
(1970)), fines of up to $1,000,000 or 10% of a firm's annual turnover are
authorized in the European Community. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
2541-42
(1973).
28. See J. Rahl, supra note 6, at 168-81.
29. See notes 33-35 infra.
30. See C. EDWARDS, supra note 17, at 197, 200; Timberg, supra note 18, at
135.
31. See C. EDWARDS, supra note 17, at 197.
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nations to reject categorically all forms of restrictive practices; foreign
enforcement systems typically rely on administrative agencies to make
ad hoc judgments on the merits of individual cases. 2 The British law,
for example, gives businessmen an opportunity to argue the validity of
any agreement before the Restrictive Practices Court, but places on
them the burden of establishing the existence of specified public
interest criteria.33 (This authority has been used-albeit rarely-to
sanction price fixing. 34 ) The German and Japanese laws provide for a
number of exceptions, including certain types of cartel agreements,
but the exceptions are always hedged by some criterion designed to
safeguard the public interest.3 The flexibility of the German and
Japanese approaches would be impractical under the American
method of judicial enforcement, a fact which accounts in large
measure for the difference in approach.
The resulting contrast between the pristine rigor of the Sherman
Act and the willingness of foreign laws to countenance exceptions can
be mistaken for a greater difference in philosophy than actually exists.
On the American side, the purity of the Sherman Act within the
sphere of its application must be discounted by the ever-growing list
of legislative exceptions to it. 36 The export exception of the Webb Act

32. Id. at 200-01.
33. See Timberg, note 11 supra.
34. See Rhinelander, supra note 11, at 830.
35. The German law on Restraints of Competition qualifies exceptions to the
general prohibition by such requirements as--"if the arrangement takes into
consideration the economy in general and the public interest" (§ 4); "if the
agreement is intended to bring about rationalization in conjunction with price
agreements or by the es.ablishment of joint purchasing or selling organizations
Syndikate), authorization may only be granted if the rationalization purpose
cannot be achieved by other means and if the rationalization is in the public
interest" (§ 5(3)); a provision for veto of proposed rationalization plans within
three months by the cartel authority (§ 5a(3)); and similar provisions in § 6(3)
(export cartels) and § 8(2). For citations to the German law see 2 OECD, GUIDE
TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (1966) [hereinafter cited as OECD GUIDE].
In Japan, the legal exceptions permitting cartels are similarly qualified; and
contrary to popular belief, cartels do not have a long and extensive history in
Japan. See E. HADLEY, supra note 6, at 358-65.
36. See note 32 supra; Ariga & Rieke, supra note 26, at 470-71; SENATE
COMM.

ON FINANCE

1ST SEss., REPORT
ON

INVESTIGATION

AND ITS SUBCOMM. ON INT'L TRADE,
UNDER SECTION

No.

332-69:

332

IMPLICATIONS

CONG.,

1930

OF MULTINATIONAL

FIRMS FOR WORLD TRADE AND INVESTMENT AND FOR
AND LABOR

93D

OF THE TARIFF ACT OF

U.S.

TRADE

12, 864-67 (1973).
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has kindred brethren, for example, permitting retail price fixing under
the "fair trade" laws37 (to an extent that would not be permissible
under some foreign laws 3 ), in agriculture and agricultural cooperatives," in fisheries cooperatives,4" by small business pools for defense
supply activities, 4 1 in insurance, 42 in banking, 4 3 in transportation (by

land," sea4 s and air 4 6 ), in communications,4 in entertainment, 8 in
electric power,4 9 in atomic energy," in securities and securities
exchanges 5" and for measures to aid the balance of payments 2 and
the national defense. 3 And these are only the federal exceptions. At
the state and local level a vast tangle of restrictive licensing and
regulatory schemes interferes with 5 4entry into business and the
freedom of existing firms to compete.
The exceptions have become so important, in fact, that the
advocacy of competitive values before the various boards and agencies
that administer them has become a major concern of the Antitrust

37. See generally REPORT OF

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE

TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS

149-55 (1955).

38. See note 25 supra.

39. 15 U.S.C. § 17; Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § § 291-92 (1970);
Cooperative Marketing Act, 7 U.S.C. § § 451-57 (1970); Agricultural Marketing
Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. § 608b (1970); Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. § §
851-55 (1970) (hog cholera).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 521 (1970).
41. 15 U.S.C. § § 636, 638, 640 (1970).
42. 15 U.S.C. § § 1011-15 (1970); 46 U.S.C. § 885 (1970).
43. Bank Merger Act of 1960, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c); Federal Reserve Act of
1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (codified in 31 U.S.C. § 409 and scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
44. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5 (1970).
45. Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 801 (1970).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970); 49 U.S.C. § § 1378, 1384 (1970).
47. Communications Act of 1943, 47 U.S.C. § § 222(b)-(f) (1970).
48. 15 U.S.C. § § 1291-95 (1970).
49. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791 et seq.
50. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 105, 68 Stat. 919, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
2135 (1970).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1970).
52. 31 U.S.C. § 932 (1970).
53. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2158 (1970).
54. See generally Address by Roland W. Donnem, former Director of Policy
Planning, Antitrust Division, FederalAntitrust Law Versus Anticompetitive State

Regulation, before the Sherman Act Committee of the Antitrust Section of the
American Bar Association, St. Louis, Missouri, Aug. 10, 1970.
Vol. 6-No. 2
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Division of the Department of Justice s In some areas such as banking
and atomic energy, for example, the regulatory criteria are framed in
terms of an explicit trade-off between competition and other public
interest factors, with a caveat to preserve as much competition as
possible.5 6 In these areas of antitrust-regulatory practice, the American and foreign approaches begin to look very much alike. The
superficial contrast between the "pure" American system and those
abroad is therefore misleading. When all the laws regulating business in
the United States are compared with those abroad, a general
procompetitive norm to which exceptions are made emerges in each
system.5" In most cases, the exceptions reflect largely domestic
matters, such as regulated utilities. But at the point where American
and foreign law are most likely to collide-the regulation of export
trade-both systems abandon the principle of competition that now
governs so much of the world's domestic commerce. As long as the
United States was virtually alone in its antitrust policy, and while
foreign legislation was still in its infancy, an exception for export
trade could be defended (if for no other reason) as an accommodation
of the differing legal regimes at home and abroad. But with the
growing acceptance of competition abroad, it may be time to ask
whether continued exemption of export trade is consistent with our

55. See generally Baker, The Antitrust Division, Department of Justice: The
Role of Competition in Regulated Industries, 11 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 571

(1970); Address by Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Kauper, The Challenge
of Competition, before the Section of Corporate, Banking and Business Law of
the American Bar Association, New York City, Oct. 27, 1972.
56. The Bank Merger Act of 1966 provides that a bank merger "whose
effect ... may be substantially to lessen competition" may be administratively
approved if such effect is "clearly outweighed in the public interest by the
probable effect of the transactions in meeting the convenience and needs of the
community to be served." 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B). The Supreme Court has
held that this defense would not apply unless the benefits to the community of
the merger could not reasonably be achieved in any other way. United States v.
Third National Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968). The Atomic Energy Act of 1954,42
U.S.C. § 2135(b), (c) (1970), provides for participation and advice by the Attorney
General in licensing proceedings and authorizes the Commission to deny a license
or issue it on conditions designed to protect the public interest in competition.
57. See note 32 supra; Ariga and Rieke, supra note 26, at 471: "An American
comparison with the genus, if not the species, can be found for almost every
exemption from the Japanese Law."
58. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or othervise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal ... ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
Spring, 1973
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own objectives and with those of our trading partners, or whether it is
instead a contretemps that threatens to undo much of the progress
made in the last quarter of a century.
B. The Contretemps in Export Trade
1. The United States.-When first enacted, the Sherman Act
contained no exception for export trade, and in fact, clearly included
it by express reference to the "foreign commerce" of the United
States. 8 With the Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act of 1918,
Congress created an exception to the Sherman Act for associations
"entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in export trade and
actually engaged solely in such export trade," and for "an agreement
made or act done in the course of export trade .... "5

9

"'Export trade"

was defined to mean "solely trade or commerce in goods, wares, or
merchandise exported, or in the course of being exported from the
United States or any Territory thereof to any foreign nation... . ,,"
The reference to goods, wares and merchandise left open the question
of the extent to which transactions involving services might be
covered. Specifically excluded from the definition of export trade
were the "production, manufacture, or selling for consumption or for
resale, within the United States or any Territory thereof, of such
goods, wares or merchandise, or any act in the course of such
production, manufacture, or selling for consumption or for resale."'"
The exclusion was designed to insulate the domestic market from any
of the immunized activities of the export association.6 2
United States participation involved a Webb-Pomerene association
that included both major and independent producers.6 3 Although
restrictive agreements between a Webb-Pomerene association and
foreign cartels since have been held illegal, at that time the Federal
Trade Commission still adhered to the interpretation announced in the
"Silver letter" of July 31, 1924, that a Webb-Pomerene association
could "adopt a trade arrangement with non-nationals" provided the

59.
60.
61.
62.

15 U.S.C. § 62 (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 61 (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 61 (1970).
S. REP. No. 1056, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1917). "Export trade" has

been held not to include sales to the United States Government or its agencies,
regardless where purchased and consumed. United States v. Concentrated
Phosphate Export Ass'n, Inc., 393 U.S. 199 (1968), consent decree approved in
final judgment, 1969 Trade Cas. 72,719 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
63. 393 U.S. at 199.
VoL 6-No. 2
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arrangement did not reach the American market or affect domestic
conditions.6 4 That interpretation was subsequently invalidated by the
court decision in the Alkali case in 1949,65 yet the Commission did
not rescind the Silver letter until 1955.66 The agreement between the
Webb-Pomerene association and the steel cartel sought to meet the
proviso in the Silver letter with a prophylactic clause declaring the
arrangements inapplicable to trade within the United States.6 7 But is
such an insulation realistic?
The immunity was further conditioned on a proviso that such an
association "does not, either in the United States or elsewhere, enter
into any agreement, understanding, or conspiracy, or do any act which
artificially or intentionally enhances or depresses prices 68 within the
United States of commodities of the class exported by such
association, or which substantially lessens competition within the
United States or otherwise restrains trade therein.1 69 Judicial decisions have held that the prohibition against restraining trade either
within the United States or of an export competitor is breached by
inclusion of foreign members in an association," by an agreement to

64. The letter is reproduced in FTC STAFF REPORT, WEBB-POMERENE
A 50 YEAR REVIEW 102-06 (1967).

ASsOCIATIONS:

65. United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59
(S.D.N.Y. 1949).
66. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 64, at 106-07. See also Simmons,
Webb-Pomerene Act andAntitrust Policy, 1963 Wisc. L. REV. 426,430.
67. The provisions, as quoted in G. STOCKING & M. WATKINS, infra note

146, at 200, provided: "Materials sold in the United States other than for export
and sold for export to the United States shall not be covered by this agreement,
and this agreement shall not be construed as in any way referring to trade in
materials so sold and shall not be allowed directly or indirectly to restrain trade
within the United States or the export trade of any domestic competitor of the
American groups or to enhance or to depress prices of such material or to lessen
competition therein within the United States."
68. The concern which led to the proviso on domestic prices was described as
follows: "While the large packers.., ought to be permitted to form associations
for the purpose of buying meat products and selling them abroad, they ought not
to be allowed to so conduct this branch of their business as to increase prices at
home more than would naturally result from the export trade. They ought not to
be permitted to buy ostensibly for this trade and then use their stock for the
purpose of depressing prices to the point of ruining home competitors, and then
raise the prices to all consumers, and thereby secure a monopoly... ." S. REP.
No. 1056, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1917).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1970).
70. United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59
(S.D.N.Y. 1949).
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substitute sales from jointly owned foreign plants for United States
exports, 7 and by division of world markets. 2 Permissible activities
have been held (or said in dicta) to include the assignment of stock in
an export association according to quotas, firm commitments by
members to use the association as their exclusive foreign outlet, the
refusal of the association to handle the exports of American
competitors, the determination of quotas and the prices at which each
member should supply products to the association, the fixing of resale
prices at which the association's distributors should sell, and the
limitation of distributors to handling products of the members.'
A significant feature of the Webb Act is that it is mandatory. Any
joint export activity that qualifies must be registered under the Act
(even if immunity is neither sought nor desired); and there is a penalty
of 100 dollars per day for a delay in filing or a failure to do so. Section
5 of the Act 7 4 requires that "[e]very association which engages solely in
export trade, within thirty days after its creation, shall file with the
Federal Trade Commission... " the information required to be filed
by the Act. This information consists (when corporations comprise
the association) of the articles of incorporation, bylaws, corporate
address, stockholder list and "... . such information as the Commission may require as to its organization business, conduct, practices,
management, and relation to other associations, corporations, partnerships, and individuals."7 "
The Federal Trade Commission is authorized to investigate violations of any of the Act's conditions, and if it concludes that the law
has been violated, it may make recommendations for "readjustment"
of the association's business; the Commission has no power, however,

71. United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass.

1950).
72. United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
73. United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947,965 (D.
Mass. 1950). The conclusion that an association can refuse to accept members
that it does not want is consistent with the legislative history. Hearings on H.R.
17350 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 64th Cong., 2d Sess.
60-61 (1917) [hereinafter cited as 1917 Hearings]. But this general privilege must
be qualified in cases where the export association becomes an indispensable means
of exporting. The Webb Act specifically provides that joint activity must not be
"in restraint of the export trade of any domestic competitor." 15 U.S.C. § 62
(1970). And it is well established that access to joint facilities, which is essential
to the competitiveness of firms, is obligatory. See note 234 infra.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 65 (1970).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 65 (1970).
Vol. 6-No. 2
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to remove the statutory privilege. It is restricted to referring alleged
violations to the Attorney General. 6
The proposal that ultimately emerged as the Webb Act was first
presented to Congress by the Federal Trade Commission, shortly after
it was established, and pursuant to section 6(h) of its enabling
statute." The bill was enacted in substantially the same form as
proposed by the Commission." It was changed in one significant
respect, however, which gave the law its special character as an
exemption. The Commission believed that its bill was simply
declaratory of existing law under the rule of reason, but argued that
the legislation was needed because businessmen felt uncertain and
because lawyers disagreed among themselves about the state of
existing law. 79 The Commission's bill arguably would not have
changed existing law, because it included a condition that the joint

76. 15 U.S.C. § 65 (1970).
77. "That the commission shall also have power-... (h) To investigate, from
time to time, trade conditions in and with foreign countries where associations,
combinations, or practices of manufacturers, merchants, or traders, or other

conditions, may affect the foreign trade of the United States, and to report to
Congress thereon, with such recommendations as it deems advisable." 15 U.S.C. §
46(h) (1970) (originally enacted as Act of September 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 6(h),
38 Stat. 717, 722).
78. The original bill, H.R. 16707, was introduced on June 28, 1916 (53
CONG. Ruc. 10,186 (1916)), but was not reproduced in full text there or in the
hearings. See Hearings on H.R. 16707 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916) [hereinafter cited as 1916 Hearings]. It is evident,

however, from the FTC testimony at those hearings (id. at 14, 23 & 25, in which
the FTC witnesses described reasons for drafting the bill as it was) and from the

limited nature of the changes made thereafter, that the basic thrust of the bill
remained substantially in its original form. See H. R. REP. No. 468, 65th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1918); S. REP. No. 9, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917); H. R. REP. No.
1118, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1916).
79. H.R. REP. No. 1118, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1916); 1916 Hearings,supra
note 78, at 7, 25. "The [Federal Trade] Commission does not believe that
Congress intended by the antitrust laws to prevent Americans from cooperating in

export trade for the purpose of competing effectively with foreigners, where such
cooperation does not restrain trade within the United States and where no
attempt is made to hinder American competitors from securing their due share of

the trade.... By its investigation the Commission, however, has established the
fact that doubt as to the application of the antitrust laws to export trade now
prevents concerted action by American business men in export trade, even among
producers of noncompeting goods.... [T]he Commission respectfully recommends the enactment of declaratory and permissive legislation to remove this
doubt." S. Doc. No. 426, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1916).
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activity "does not restrain the export trade of the United States." 80
This was amended by the Senate to read "and is not in restraint of the
export trade of any domestic competitor.""
The Senate report
commented that otherwise the exemption granted would be taken
away, 2 which was true and which was why the FTC could argue that
its bill was simply declaratory of existing law. The Commission's stated
objective of providing certainty for businessmen was not satisfied by
its proposed bill. The Senate change, however, clarified the bill and
considerably altered the status of existing law by creating a complete
exemption for conduct within export trade that might otherwise have
violated the Sherman Act. Thus price fixing, division of markets,
quotas, and the like were made permissible among the members of an
association, inter se.8 3 The United States, which had pioneered in
antitrust legislation," thus also led the way to a retreat from the
competitive norm in international trade. Canada's law, which antedated the Sherman Act, carved out a similar exception, but not until
1960.85
80. S. RaP. No. 1056, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1917) (emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. The FTC saw a danger that the Act might be used unfairly against
individual American exporters in foreign trade, which it sought to remedy by (1) a
specific extension of unfair competition law to export trade (§ 4 of the Act, 15
U.S.C. § 64 (1970)), (2) reports to the FTC, and (3) enforcement of the antitrust
laws. See S. Doc. No. 426, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1916). But within the
exempted trade, the antitrust laws and FTC reports would have no effect. The
extended remedy against unfair competition in export trade was designed to
substitute for, and some apparently viewed it as embodying the substance of, the
antitrust laws. See 1917 Hearings,supra note 73, at 128. Others recognized that
"unfair competition" does not reach all that the antitrust laws do and bemoaned
creating this void in antitrust coverage. Id. at 77, 122-23, 128. In practice, this
unfair competition remedy has been a dead letter and does not appear to have
impressed businessmen as incorporating the substance of the Sherman Act.
84. It may be significant that the Webb Act was enacted when American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), was still the leading case on
the application of the antitrust laws to international commerce. Congress might
have been more concerned about what it was giving away if it had had before it
the very different implications of the holdings in United States v. Sisal Sales
Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927), United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d
416 (2d Cir. 1945), Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370
U.S. 690 (1962), or the international cartel cases cited note 153 infra.
85. Canada carved out a similar exemption for exports in 1960. For the
background of and rationale for the Canadian law see Note, The Purpose,
Operation and Effect of the Export Exemption Provision of the Combines
Investigation Act (Section 32 (4) and (5)), 3 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 106 (1964).
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2. Germany.-Section 6 of the German Act Against Restraints of
Competition, enacted in July 1957, exempts agreements between
enterprises "which serve to promote exports insofar as they are
limited to regulation of competition in markets outside the area to
which this Act applies." 6 Such export agreements are permitted even
if they have an effect on the domestic market." On the other hand,
the German law contains two safeguards that do not apply to
Webb-Pomerene associations: first, the agreement must serve to
"protect or promote exports" to be valid; and secondly, if the
agreement affects domestic commerce, it is valid only insofar as it "is
necessary to insure the desired regulation of competition" in exports.
An export agreement may not be approved if it may lead to a
substantial restraint of competition within Germany and if there is "a
predominating interest in preserving competition."
3. The European Economic Community.-The antitrust provisions
of the Treaty of Rome, which created the European Economic
Community, contain no express exception for exports. As a general
rule, however, it is recognized that agreements relating solely to
exports are not prohibited insofar as they do not affect trade between
the member states, and the Commission has ruled to this effect 8 In

86. Section 6(1) of the German Law as translated in 2 OECD GUIDE, supra
note 35, 1.0, at 6.
87. Id. § 6(2). See also 3 H. Blake, supra note 6, at 104. On its face, this
would appear contrary to the American law, but in light of the difficulty of
insulating the domestic market from all effects of an export agreement and Judge
Wyzanski's statement in Minnesota Mining, 92 F. Supp. at 965, that Congress
intended to accept such inevitable effects, the practical effect of the United States
and German laws may not be as different in this respect as they seem.
88. See, e.g., Grosfillex Co., 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2412.37 (1973);
S.A. Nicholas Freres, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 2412.46 (1973); Dutch
Engineers and Contractors, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2412.31 (1973). The
German Federal Cartel Office has ruled that agreements relating only to exports
do not violate EEC rules. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, No. 10, 1 CCH COMM.
MKT. REP.
2011.383 (1973). The High Authority of the Coal and Steel
Community, however, has ruled that the French and German steel industries
would violate the competition rules of the ECSC "by entering into an agreement
for allocation of export orders received from nonmember countries, if such
allocation were shown indirectly to affect the common market for coal and steel
so as to restrict the normal competition in that market." 1 CCH COMM. MKT.
REP.
2011.382 (1973) (answer by the High Authority of Coal and Steel
Community, dated May 5, 1961, to written question No. 16 submitted in
Parliament by Mr. Nederhorst, Official Journalof European Communities No. 35,
May 20, 1961). Export arrangements may in some cases have an effect on trade
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addition, an export agreement might be exempted under article 85(3),
which provides for ad hoc exemptions for agreements otherwise in
violation of the general provisions in article 85(1) for:
concerted practices... which contribute to the improvement of
the production or distribution of goods or to the promotion of
technical or economic progress while reserving to users an
equitable share in the profit therefrom, and which:
(a) neither impose on the enterprises concerned any restrictions not indispensable to the attainment of the above objectives;
(b) nor enable such enterprises to eliminate competition in
89
respect of a substantial proportion of the goods concerned.
Moreover, the Community may take regulatory actions under its
own authority to impose regulations governing exports (among other
matters), as it has done in the past under the Coal and Steel Treaty.90
Both the article 85(3) exemption and the Community-authorized
regulatory action represent procedures by which decisions are made
on an ad hoc basis, rather than through a categorical exception9 1 such
as the Webb-Pomerene Act.
4. Japan.-Japanalso makes an exception to its antitrust laws for
exports, but in yet another way. Both exports and imports are
comprehensively governed by a special statute, the Export and Import
Trading Act of 1952.92 The stated purpose of the Act "is to prevent
unfair export trading and to establish order in export and import
trading, and thereby to promote the sound development of foreign
trade." 9 3 Section 5 of the Act recalls Webb-Pomerene: "Exporters
may enter into an agreement on price, quantity, quality design, or any

between the member states and so come within article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty.
See DERINGER, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN EcONOMIC

128, 141, 142 (1968).
89. 1 CCH COMM. MET. REP. 2051 (1973).
90. Official Journalof European Communities No. 76, April 21, 1967.
91. "Categorical" is used here to connote a legislative exception. The
European Commission does grant certain "categorical" exemptions for certain
types of agreements; but these are based on ad hoc judgments by administrative
officials on the merits of certain types of agreement, and they are free to change
their minds (prospectively). See Kobak, Three Approaches to the Bureaucratic
Dilemma: The Administration and Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws of the
United States, France, and the Common Market, 23 ALA. L. REV. 43, 89-90
(1970).
92. Extracted in 4 OECD GUIDE, supra note 35, at 12. Citations to the
Japanese statute refer to this translation.
93. Id. § 1.
COMMUNITY
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other matter in relation to commodities of a particular kind to be
exported to a specific destination, by notifying the Minister of
International Trade and Industry within ten days from the day of its
conclusion." 9 4 The Minister of International Trade and Industry
(MITI), however, is given much greater power and a more specific
mandate than the Federal Trade Commission in the United States. The
Minister, on receipt of a notice of agreement, is directed to order the
agreement modified or prohibit its conclusion if it fails to fulfill any
of the following criteria:
[1] There is no fear of violating treaties and other arrangements concluded
with foreign governments or the international agencies;
[2] The interest of importers or enterprises concerned at the destination is
not injured and there is no fear of gravely injuring international confidence
in Japanese exporters;
[3] In addition to the preceding two paragraphs, there is no fear of gravely
injuring the sound development of export trade;
[4] Its contents are not unjustly discriminatory;
[5] The participation in or the withdrawal from the agreement is not unjustly restricted;
[6] There is no fear of unjustly injuring the interests of domestic agriculture, forestry and fishery enterprises concerned and other enterprises concerned or consumers in general. 95
The matter of production for export, which, in the United States,
specifically was covered by amendment prior to the enactment of
Webb-Pomerene, 9 6 is governed in Japan by a separate review procedure paralleling that for export agreements, again subject to
authorization by MITI.9 7 Both of these provisions apply to exporters.

94. Id. § 5.
95. Id. § 5-his.
96. S. REP. No. 1056, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1917). The amendment added
the following underscored words in § 1 (15 U.S.C. § 61 (1970)) to permit buying
and selling within the United States as long as the goods are ultimately exported:
"The words 'export trade' shall not be deemed to include the production,
manufacture or selling for consumption within the United States .... " (emphasis
added).
97. "Exporters may enter into an agreement on price, quantity, quality,
design, or any other matter in domestic transactions relating to commodities of a
particular kind to be exported to a specific destination, or may enter into an
agreement on these matters with producers or sellers of the said commodities to
be exported to the said destination by obtaining the authorization of the Minister
of International Trade and Industry." Note 92 supra, § 5-2(1). The Minister is
directed not to approve the agreement unless it satisfies condition [2] quoted
supra in the text. See note 92 supra, § 5-2(2).
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A distinct authorization is provided for producers or sellers of
commodities to be exported to a specific destination, and they too are
subject to the same conditions.9 There is, in addition, an unusual
provision for agreements coordinating imports and exports when
import restrictions or foreign governmental arrangements make this
necessary. 99
Export associations are governed by a different section. Thus,
unlike American law, Japanese law grants the privilege to agree on
export prices, division of markets, quotas and similar practices
restricting competition independently of the formation of an association. In addition to serving as a vehicle for such agreements, an
association may serve the following purposes:
[1] Prevention of unfair export trading- by members ...belonging to any
export association;
[2] The maintenance and cultivation of overseas export markets, for example, by survey, publicity, good offices, in regard to export;
[3] Improvement of price, quality, design and any other matter relating to
commodities to be exported;
[4] Dealing with complaints and disputes relating to exports;
[5] Activities incidential to activities within each of the preceding paragraphs;
[6] ...facilities for furtherance of the common interest of members of the
export associations; and
[7] Loan of funds (including discounting100of notes) to its members and
borrowing thereof in favour of its members.
The Japanese export regime thus shares the common exemption
policy toward restrictive practices in exports; but the Japanese system
hedges its policy of exemption with elaborate safeguards to protect
against harmful effects, both domestically and in export markets, and
includes a substantial power of intervention by the supervising
government agency.
5. Universality of the Exception.-The foregoing examples illustrate several different legislative approaches that have the common
feature of excluding the application of normal antitrust rules to
export trade. Comparable exceptions appear in the United Kingdom
and many other countries! 1 The existence of an exception, whether

98. Note 92 supra, § 5-3.
99. Note 92 supra, § 7-3.
100. Note 92 supra, § 11.
101. Section 21(1)(f) of the British law (3 OECD GUIDE, supra note 35) lists
as one ground for upholding an otherwise prohibited restriction a finding "that
hsving regard to the conditions actually obtaining or reasonably foreseen at the
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by express provision or because the rules do not apply, appears to be
universal. Does this mean that export trade is somehow economically
different than domestic commerce, that the economic forces which
favor competition as a domestic policy do not operate similarly in
foreign commerce and that international commerce will function best
if freed of the differing competitive rules that apply to national or
regional markets? Or is this common policy toward international trade
an exception that threatens to swallow the rule?
C.

The Collision Course of NationalPolicies:
Extraterritorialityin Reverse

One of the key arguments urged by supporters of the Webb Act in
1916-1918, and by those who would retain it, is that American industry
should be allowed to compete abroad under the same ground rules as
its foreign competition.'0 2 In 1916-1918, when those ground rules
embraced cartelization with a bear hug,"0 3 it involved no conflict with
foreign law for the United States to authorize its exporters to do what
others were legally doing abroad. Indeed, that conclusion would
appear to follow
under conflict of laws doctrine, even without the
04
Webb Act.1
But can this remain true when the foreign law changes to favor
competition and to outlaw cartel practices? The conduct sanctioned
time of the application, the removal of the restriction would be likely to cause a
reduction in the volume or earnings of the export business which is substantial
either in relation to the whole export business of the United Kingdom or in
relation to the whole business (including export business) of the said trade or
industry." In many cases there is no specific provision, but this is unnecessary
where the national law would not otherwise permit concerted export activity.
102. "Few, if any, foreign countries compel their exporters to observe
business standards prescribed by our antitrust laws, [sic] then why should we
require our exporters to observe a higher and stricter standard of conduct than
their foreign competitors are required to observe? In other words, by this bill we
permit our American exporters to meet their foreign rivals on foreign soil on equal
terms." H.R. REP. No. 1118, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1916).
103. See notes 12, 14-16 supra.
104. Cf. J. Rahl, supra note 6, ch. 7. See generally W. FUGATE, FOREIGN
COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS § 3.16, at 87-93 (1958); Fugate,
Damper or Bellows? Antitrust Laws and Foreign Trade, 45 A.B.A.J. 947,948-49
(1959); Timberg, Antitrust and Foreign Trade, 48 Nw. U.L. REV. 411,414-15
(1953); Note, The Conflict of Laws and the ExtraterritorialApplication of the
Sherman Act, 4 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 164 (1972); Note, Extraterritorial
Application of the Antitrust Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 70 YALE L.J.
259 (1960).
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by United States laws then may violate the law of the importing
country, and under the effects test of jurisdiction can result in legal
liability. This prospect was noted when the first significant foreign
antitrust legislation emerged, 01° and recently there have been signs of a
legal clash between Scandinavian and Japanese export cartel practices
and the German antitrust law.'0 6 In at least one instance the existence
of an American Webb-Pomerene sanctioned association was relied on
to justify an import buyers' cartel under the British Restrictive
Business Practices Legislation.' 0 7 The extraterritoriality problem is
now reversed-with the export of restrictive practices to nations where
they are no longer welcome.
The potential for conflict is well illustrated by one of the classic
cases in the perennial debate over extraterritoriality: the Swiss watch
cartel case. 0 8 That case involved a whole gamut of restrictive practices
adopted in Switzerland, where they were entirely legal and favored by
government policy, but which had a direct impact on the import
commerce of the United States." 9 A recent commentary on that case
undertook an extensive review of its background and facts to support
the conclusion that the practices complained of were matters of local
concern and great importance to the Swiss, a question of regulating
their own domestic economy. 1 The question was raised whether a
traditional adversary court proceeding is an appropriate forum for
resolving issues raised by the acts of foreign nationals within their own
territory. 1 ' An answer to this question is that a conflict of laws
doctrine has been developed to deal with precisely that kind of
problem and was applied in the Swiss watch case so that the final
judgment reached only those practices that operated outside Swiss
territory. 2 On the larger policy question of the legitimacy of the
importing country's stake in prohibiting these practices, the com-

105. See, e.g., Timberg, Conflict and Growth in the International and
Comparative Law of Antitrust, 4 ABA SECT. INT'L & COMP. L. BULL. 20,

24-25 (1960).
106. See Antitrusters Nip a Steel Cartel Bid, BUSINESS WEEK, March 6,
1971, at 42.
107. The case involved United States sulphur exports. See FTC STAFF
REPORT, supra note 64, at 58.
108. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 1962
Trade Cas. 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
109. 1962 Trade Cas. at 77,456-57.
110. J. Rahl, supra note 6, at 311-63.
111. Id. at 312.
112. See Note, The Conflict of Laws and the ExtraterritorialApplication of
the Sherman Act, 4 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 164, 169-70 (1972).
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mentary recited but took no account of facts showing that the
primary impact of Swiss policies affecting its watch industry was
abroad. Counsel for the Swiss Government alleged that "95% of the
production" of the Swiss watch industry was exported.1 13 The Swiss
watch industry was said to be the largest in the world with a share of
total world production ranging from 53.4 per cent to 67.5 per cent 114
and the United States was described as "the largest single export
market for Swiss watches." 1 1 Under circumstances of this kind, it
would seem difficult to argue that the importing country has no
legitimate interest in barring the export of restrictive practices.
"Extraterritorial" enforcement has accompanied the spread of
antitrust legislation. The European Economic Community has recently
fined foreign firms in the Dyestuffs case.116 The Europeans have
exhibited no sympathy for a policy by other nations to export
restrictive practices they will not tolerate at home.11
A further anomaly is that because of the universality of the
exemption for exports, international trade has been singularly
excepted from the spreading antitrust norm. Those defending the
exemption under our own law can point out that foreign export
cartels are still legal. This argument has some merit, though it should
be discounted in at least two respects. First, the justification of export
cartels by the existence of cartelized markets within individual foreign
countries is a factor of decreasing importance. Second, as to
competition with cartels for international markets, the potential for
conflict with the laws of importing countries may exert increasing
pressure against cartel activity, as suggested by the recent protests of
the European Economic Community and Germany." 8 But a more
basic question is whether exempting exports from antitrust regulation
is the appropriate way of accommodating the special problems of
international trade.

113. See J. Rahl, supra note 6, at 340.
114. Id. at 339.
115. Id. at 340.
116. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2542.39 (1973).
117. See, e.g., Remarks of Jochen Thiesing, 25 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 207,
209 (1970).
118. See note 106 supra.
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II.

SHOULD EXPORTS BE EXEMPT FROM
THE RULES OF COMPETITION?

A. Rationale for the Exemption: The ContinuingControversy
The Federal Trade Commission's rationale for proposing the Webb
Act (expressed in the committee reports)" 9 was that: (1) American
firms were disadvantaged in export trade by both a combination of
superior facilities available to foreigners (in transportation, finance
and existing foreign investments) and the cooperation by foreign firms
among themselves and with their governments; (2) American firms
(particularly small ones) were disadvantaged by uncertainties concerning the legality of joint efforts among themselves; and (3) an urgent
need to expand United States exports required removal of this
uncertainty. 2 ' As noted earlier, the bill was drafted on the theory
that it was only declaratory of existing law,' 2 ' and much of the debate
centered on whether the kinds of cooperation desired could be carried
on without special legislation.' 2 2
The Commission presented a two-volume study in support of its
proposal.12 The bulk of it was a description of cartels and cartel
practices abroad, which served as a premise for the argument that
American firms should be permitted to do the same things when
competing internationally. 2 4 While the advocates of the Act
emphasized its supposed advantages to small business, 2 ' the FTC
clearly stated from the beginning that the legislation would extend to
large as well as to small firms.' 2 6 The purported advantages to small
firms were emphasized repeatedly throughout the debates, however,
and were relied on heavily in explaining how American business would
be helped by the legislation.' 2 7 The special expenses of exporting that
a large firm could handle easily might deter small firms, but if a
number of small firms could cooperate and share the overhead
expenses, exporting would be more attractive.' 2 8

119. See note 78 supra.
120. FTC, COOPERATION IN AMERICAN EXPORT TRADE, Doc. No.
426, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1916).
121. See note 79 supra.
122. See, e.g., 1916 Hearings,supra note 78, at 25, 36 & 43.

123. FTC, COOPERATION
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
6. In a

IN FOREIGN TRADE

(1916).

Id. at 375.
1916 Hearings,supra note 78, at 12.
Id. at 12-13.
See, eg., FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 64, at 6.
See FTC, supra note 120, at 6; FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 64, at
different context, however, much stress has been laid on how much more
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The bill was controversial-its opponents arguing that no exemption
was necessary, 129 that to grant an exemption would be contrary to the
philosophy of the Sherman Act 3 ' and that monopolistic practices in
export trade would inevitably spill over into domestic markets and
increase domestic prices.3
The Act's opponents also claimed that
commercial export houses, brokers and agents could perform the same
functions as an export association, and more effectively. 3 2 The
evidence of extensive cartel practices abroad and the feeling that
United States businessmen should be able to compete on the same
terms without the uncertainty of antitrust liability constantly hanging
over their heads appears to have been the decisive consideration
spurring passage of the Act.' 3 3
Enactment did not still the controversy over the Webb Act.
Businessmen soon complained that the exemption was not broad
enough to overcome the uncertainty of violations, 134 and a series of
135
successful prosecutions has not quieted these protests.
Some critics of the Act have continued to urge its repeal. This was
the minority view of the Attorney General's National Committee to
Study the Antitrust Laws in 1955,136 and the recommendations of
Kingman Brewster, Jr., in his 1958 study of the antitrust laws in

efficient-and less costly--selling is in export than in domestic markets. For a
discussion of a number of such factors to explain how imports may tend to
undercut domestic prices see VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 9-12 (1966). Foreign orders are generally in larger units, and
through one or a few buyers with whom an exchange of cables may suffice to
complete a transaction, in contrast to the vast selling and service establishments
that must be kept on hand domestically.
129. H.R. REP. No. 50, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1917).
130. Id. at 6.
131. Id.; FTC STAFF REPORT supra note 64, at 7.
132. See supra note 129, at 6; note 237 infra.
133. "The bill seeks to ... [aid and encourage our manufacturers to extend
our foreign trade] by permitting the organization of cooperative selling agencies
or associations among American exporters in order that they may meet foreign
competition on equal terms in international commerce." H.R. REP. No. 1118,
64th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1916).
134. As early as 1945, the National Foreign Trade Council was proposing a
broadening of the Act to permit joining with foreign firms in furtherance of the
interests of foreign policy and national security. G. STOCKING & M. WATKINS,
supra note 12, at 257-58.
135. See notes 70 & 71 supra.
136. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE ANTITRUST LAWS 114 (1955).
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foreign commerce, 13 and of former Assistant Attorney General
Donald F. Turner in testimony before the Hart Committee in 1967.138
In addition to the arguments originally urged against the Act, current
critics point to the relatively small portion of our export trade
actually conducted by Webb associations,' 3 9 and to the accrual of
benefits provided by the Act mainly to large firms in concentrated
industries fully capable of exporting on their own,14 while the smaller
firms for which the Act was intended have largely ignored it.' 4 '
Another argument has been that Webb associations are useful largely
for the export pf undifferentiated, fungible commodities and not for
the high technology exports in which the United States has its greatest
relative advantage.' 4 2
The majority of the Attorney General's study committee in 1955
declined to recommend repeal, asserting that while some small firms
may be helped, the relative disuse of the Act assures that any adverse
consequences are minimal and noting that abuses may be controlled
through continued enforcement action.' 4 3 The committee did not rely
on the argument, emphasized by others, that as long as state trading
and cartel practices persist abroad, this privilege should remain
available to American firms."' Former FTC Chairman Kirkpatrick
defended retention of the Act, observing that while the Act was
little-used, the dollar value of exports under it is substantial and
concluding that it "performs an office."' 45
Others have urged changes in the criteria and administration of the
Act. George Stocking and Myron Watkins, coauthors of several major

137. K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
454-55 (1958).
138. Hearings on S. Res. 26 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 125 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as 1967 Hearings].
139. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 64, at 35. In the survey period
1958-1962, Webb Association exports accounted for less than 5% of U.S. exports.
140. Id. at 44-45.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 37.
143. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE TO
STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 113-14 (1955).
144. See, e.g., 1916 Hearings, supra note 78, at 4; S. Doc. No. 426, 64th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4. This factor was stressed in connection with the Canadian
legislation. See supra note 85, at 106.
145. Hearings on S. 2754 Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce and
Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as 1972 Hearings].
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cartel studies,14 6 recommended that associations be limited to groups
of small scale enterprises with strictly defined cooperative principles,
and that associations not be permitted to include more than 25 per
cent of the total exports of any commodity.14" A staff report of the
Federal Trade Commission in 1967 recommended amending the Act
both to limit the size of eligible firms and to require a showing of
need. 148 This resembles Brewster's alternative recommendation that if
the Act is retained, exemptions should be limited to ad hoc
1 49
determinations of need and suitability of the proposed joint action.
Recent amendments offered in Congress would expand the
immunity. 5 0 The President's trade package for 1973 proposes an
amendment to the Webb Act that would extent its coverage
moderately but would make registration and immunity optional,
would require ad hoc approval by the Federal Trade Commission on
such conditions as it may prescribe (after an opportunity for the
Attorney General to comment) and would empower the Commission
to withdraw immunity prospectively for cause. 1 5' The amendment

146. E.g., G.

STOCKING & M. WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION

(1947).

147. G. STOCKING & M. WATKINS, supra note 12, at 436.
148. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 64, at 69-70.
149. See K. BREWSTER, note 137 supra; 1967 Hearings, supra note 138, at
64.
150. S.4120, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); S. 1483, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973). S.2754, for example, would confer immunity from suit by the FTC or
the Justice Department for five years. The charter could not be revoked unless the
Secretary of Commerce finds that the association has taken some action for the
principal purpose of restraining export trade of a domestic competitor or of
lessening competition within the United States. The bill would omit the existing
prohibition against domestic price effects, would cover all types of technology
licenses and might be construed to cover investments as well as exports. 1972
Hearings,supra note 145, at 3-47.
151. See note 2 supra. Title H of the bill would amend the Webb Act. Title II,
§ 3 provides for the voluntary registration and enlarges the reporting requirement,
including § 3(a)(ix): "...

. any other information which the Commission may

require concerning the organization, operation, management or finances of the
association, the relation of the association to other associations and to the export
trade being conducted; and competition or potential competition, and effects of
the association thereon." On receipt of the application, the FTC would be
directed to furnish copies immediately to the Attorney General (§ 3(b)), who
may also request further information, and must submit a report within 90 days.
The FTC may register the application "for such period of time and subject to such
conditions as it deems appropriate if... [it finds that the organization and
operation] ...is not likely to result in substantially lessening competition, or
restraining the domestic or import trade of the United States, or substantially
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would also make the entire Act expire within five years unless
renewed.'- 2
The full range of choices of whether, how and to what extent there
should be immunity from the antitrust laws in export trade thus has
been presented. The arguments summarized above raise two basic
issues: first, is there something different about export trade that
warrants some departure from normal antitrust rules; secondly, if so,
what form should that exemption take? Let us avoid entanglement in
the first issue. It would be impossible to answer it definitively in the
negative because the endless variety of international business conditions can always present new and unforeseen problems. The practical
question is how these problems should be identified and accommodated. Reliance on the rule of reason was rejected in 1918 for fear of
uncertainty. But was a categorical grant of immunity the only
alternative?
The immunity approach of Webb-Pomerene, its counterparts abroad
and the proposals to broaden the exemption all imply that business
should be free of antitrust restraint in export trade. Is this laissez faire
approach likely to further exports, cope with the competitive
pressures of foreign cartels and state trading, avoid conflict between
the antitrust laws and our foreign policy objectives and promote the
national security? There is experience by which those propositions
may be tested, and since the proposals for broadening Webb-Pomerene
include elimination of its present limitations, it makes sense to test
them in terms of a complete exemption to join and participate in
foreign cartels.
B. The HistoricalExperience with Cartels
There is extensive experience with trade restraints in international
Some revealing insights into the behavior of business
commerce.'

restraining exports by domestic non-members." § 3(c). Section 4(a) authorizes
the FTC, whenever "any material act, practice or course of conduct" is not in
conformance with its registration statement, to "(i) require that the statement be
amended, (ii) require that the organization or operation of the association be
modified, (iii) revoke, in whole or in part, the registration of the association
and/or (iv) recommend to the Justice Department prosecution of the appropriate
persons... under the Antitrust Laws."
152. Id. § 5(b).

153. E. HEXNER, INTERNATIONAL CARTELS (1944); C. EDWARDS,
CARTELIZATION IN WESTERN EUROPE (1964) (reprinted in Hearings on S.
262 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 475 (1964); id., pt. 2, Antitrust
Development and Regulations of Foreign Countries (appendix); C. EDWARDS,
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when unbridled by the rules of competition (through private
agreements or with the collaboration of governments) can be obtained
by an examination of the trade restraint experience.
Let us postpone a definition of "cartel" to a survey of the various
kinds of restrictions that might be included in that term. The
examples that follow include purely private restrictions, some that are
wholly governmental and some mixtures of the two. The common
feature is the resort to some limitation on the freedom of buyers and
sellers to act independently in international trade. While it is true that
14
all cartel practices have the basic objective of limiting competition,
the purposes of cartelization as well as the means employed vary
widely. Our focus is not so much on the desirability or the
justification of these practices as on the implication of their existence
abroad for American firms competing in foreign markets. For this
purpose three different levels of cartel objectives can be distinguished. 1"5 One is defensive: the cartel is designed to alleviate some basic
maladjustment in an industry, typically characterized by excess supply
and too many producers. This category should include those Japanese
cartels used to restrain exports which reach disruptive levels. The
second level includes the overwhelming preponderance of historical
cartels, which have as their central object a kind of industrial truce to
limit or eliminate competition between the members, accompanied by
78TH CONG., 2D SEss., ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CARTELS (Comm. Print 1944); FTC STAFF REPORT, 82D
CONG.,

2D

SEss.,

THE

INTERNATIONAL

PETROLEUM,

THE

CARTEL

(Comm. Print 1952); G. STOCKING & M. WATKINS, supra note 12; G.
STOCKING & M. WATKINS, supra note 146. See also United States v.
Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas.

70,600

(S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Bayer Co., 135 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955);

United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), opinion on remedies, 105 F. Supp. 215 (1952); United States v. Minnesota
Mining and Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950); United States v. United
States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); United States v.
General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949), opinion on remedies, 115 F.
Supp. 835 (1953) (incandescent lamps); United States v. General Electric Co., 80

F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (carbology); United States v. National Lead Co.,
63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
154. See C. EDWARDS, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
INTERNATIONAL CARTELS, supra note 153, at 9.

ASPECTS

OF

155. Professor Edwards classifies cartels into three basic types: (1) associations of firms using joint selling agencies, quota arrangements and the like, (2)
patent licensing agreements which have the effect of dividing markets and
territories, and (3) combines in which joint investments are made in a joint
venture or subsidiary. Id. at 2-9.
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varying degrees of exploitation of consumers. The third level is
relatively rare: the monopolization or domination of international
markets by an aggressive combine in a single country, aided by some
degree of government collaboration. The following examples1 5 6 are
illustrative of the three categories.
1. Defensive Cartels.-The interwar cartels in the sugar and natural
rubber industries were created to cope with severe problems of
oversupply. Both of these agricultural commodities suffered periods of
substantial overproduction that led to governmental action restricting
production and protecting national sources. In the case of sugar, the
problem arose following World War I when European governments
took vigorous action through subsidies and tariffs to revive the sugar
beet production that had been interrupted during the War.'" 7 Cane
producers in Puerto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines had increased
production during the War and, failing to anticipate the rapid
comeback of European beet production, had invested in expanded
capacity. Protective tariffs in the United States and elsewhere
continued to stimulate increased production, and the surplus had no
sufficient outlet in the protected foreign markets.
The initial efforts to cope with this problem by agreement among
the private producers under the "Chadbourne Plan" were unsuccessful. 5' Ultimately, 21 governments representing 85 to 90 per cent of
the world production joined in the International Sugar Agreement of
1937, in which they agreed to limit production and exports and
maintain their 1937 level of import purchases. The clear purpose of
the agreement was not to expand exports but to limit excess
production and to avoid major capital losses by the private interests
involved."5 9 It was a rescue operation, carried out by governments, and
appears to have been reasonably successful for that purpose. Even the
private agreement, however, was defensive, and it probably helped the

156. The record is so vast that these descriptions are necessarily based on
secondary sources. All statements of fact are therefore only reports of conclusions
reached by scholars, government officials, and in some instances by courts. None
are presented as the first-hand observation of this author or the present position
of any government agency.
157. The following textual description is based on the account in G.
STOCKING & M. WATKINS, supra note 146, at 24-26, 28, 31, 37-44, 54-55,67
& 71-78.
158. In it, the signatories undertook to restrict their exports to specified
tonnages, but did not fix prices. Although production of the signatory producers
was reduced slightly, that of nonsigners increased by almost exactly the same
amount. Id. at 37-40.
159. Id. at 44.
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nonmembers, since the reduction in the members' production removed that much competitive supply from the limited market
available.
The problem in rubber, too, was one of world oversupply, though
not stimulated by government subsidies and protection. The problem
seems to have resulted from the combined effects of the long lead
time required for new rubber trees to become productive, and from
the sharp swings in demand and in the availability of essential
transportation that occurred during the years 1910-1921. Again, a
private cartel plan proved ineffective through its inability to include
all the producers, and the British Government imposed mandatory
controls on Empire sources. For a time the controls brought increased
prosperity (and higher prices) to British producers but the plan ran
into trouble with increased production from outside sources, both
natural and synthetic, that led Britain to drop its restrictions. The
Great Depression, however, created new pressures and an intergovernmental cartel agreement was signed on May 7, 1934. The
International Rubber Regulation Agreement lasted until 1944. It
limited exports and production, barred the accumulation of surplus
stocks and prohibited new plantings. These restrictive agreements
eventually yielded in importance to the very different type of cartel
that evolved in the synthetic rubber industry.
Both the sugar and rubber cartels thus were designed to reduce, not
increase, exports, required government action to become effective and
encountered their greatest difficulty in the competition of nonparticipating sellers. In each case, the restrictive measures appear to have
benefited rather than disadvantaged nonmembers. Cartels of this kind
would hardly seem to make a case for permitting American firms to
enter cartel arrangements on the ground that they must do so to
compete effectively.
2. The Classic Cartels.-The classic cartel is the most typical in
international trade. While occasional market imbalances occur in the
industries involved, these cartels typically are not the result of massive
dislocations. The examples presented are but a few of the many
available.""0 They fall into two general patterns: cooperative arrangements among manufacturers to live and let live; and, in the case of raw
material suppliers, combinations for the purpose of extracting
monopoly prices.
(a) The Pre-World War II Steel Cartels.-Two international steel
cartels were formed and broken up between World Wars I and II.
These were private horizontal agreements supported by the govern-

160. See generally sources cited note 153 supra.
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ments (except
that of the United States) of the participating
61
countries.'
The first cartel was organized on September 30, 1926, between
steel producers of Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Saar and
France. Its object was to stabilize the steel markets in those areas by
determining the total level of production, dividing it among the
respective countries by formulas and by penalizing the members from
any country whose collective exports exceeded its quota. The quotas
applied to an entire country's production, including both members
and nonmembers of the cartel-a -circumstance that gave the members
a strong incentive to organize their own national industries. The cartel
did not work well, however, because of outside competition. Constant
German pressure for increases in that country's quota resulted in the
division of the quota limits into two parts: one for domestic and one
for export trade, with a smaller fine for exceeding the domestic than
the export quota (hardly an incentive to increase exports); the cartel
was dissolved in 1931.
The second international steel cartel went into effect on June 1,
1933, initially consisting of groups from Germany, France, Belgium
and Luxembourg, but later expanded to include the major producers
in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria, Britain and the United States,
representing in total approximately 90 per cent of all iron and steel in
international trade during 1937.
The basic operating principles were the same as in the earlier steel
cartel, although the administrative organization was much more
elaborate. Export quotas again were distributed among groups of
producers on a country-by-country basis, with penalties imposed for
exports in excess of the quota even if attributable to nonmembers of
the cartel.
A stated purpose of the association was "to conduct export
operations in such a manner as to disturb foreign markets as little as
possible." ' 2 The asserted advantages of the association to this end
were the establishment of uniform terms and contracts for export
sales, standardization of weight and qualities, and collection and
exchange of information regarding foreign markets' 6 3 In addition to
these advantages, however,
the Export Association agreed, on behalf of its members, to recognize the
domestic markets of other cartel members as their exclusive marketing
161. The description of the steel cartels is based on G.
WATKINS,supra note

162. Id. at 199.
163. Id.
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territory. In return, the cartel recognized certain areas as American spheres
of influence. American exporters received quotas based on their share of
certain export markets during the year 1936.164
Furthermore,
the Export Association assumed responsibility at the outset for keeping
American exports within the assigned quotas. Should total American
exports of any product exceed the American quota, the Association
excess resulted from failure
obligated itself to pay penalties even though the
1 65
of independents to cooperate in the programs.
The association members thus had to pay fines for nonmembers'
exports in excess of the quota, and so they
urged their European colleagues to cut prices in certain export markets to
eliminate American nonmembers from the trade. As one Association
member expressed it, 'the sooner these mills are eliminated from taking
chances will be of bringing them under
export business the better
' 66our
control in our own group. 1
It may be recalled that the basic premise of the Webb Act was that
exports could be increased by making it possible for smaller firms to
sell through associations and thereby overcome the disadvantages of
exporting individually. The experience of this Webb association
appears to have been exactly the reverse. The second international
steel cartel was disrupted by World War I1.167
(b) The International Petroleum Cartel.-The vast cartel that
controlled the international markets for crude oil and refined products
was described in detail by a staff report of the Federal Trade
Commission in 1952.168 The extensive control accomplished through
joint ownership and operation of reserve and producing assets and
through interlocking stock ownership need not detain us here.16 9 The
restrictive agreements dividing markets are the significant indications

164. Id. at 199-200 (footnotes omitted).
165. Id. at 200.
166. Id. at 202 (footnotes omitted).
167. Id.
168. FTC STAFF, 82D CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CARTEL (Comm. Print No. 6 1952). Those practices
that restricted United States commerce were terminated by consent decrees
against the principal defendants. See generally United States v. Texaco, 1963
70,819 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1969
Trade Cas.
72,742 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 1969
Trade Cas.
Trade Cas. 72,743 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
169. See G. STOCKING & M. WATKINS, supra note 146, ch. 1-7.
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of behavior to which these companies resorted in their belief, however
mistaken, that they were free of antitrust restraints.
There were four main agreements that, like the steel cartels, had as
their central object the division of markets to avoid competition, most
especially, price competition. The basic agreement was the Achnacarry, or "As is" Agreement of 1928.17° The first of its governing
principles was "the acceptance by the units of their present volume of
business and their proportion of any future increases in consumption."17 ' This represented a broad agreement or charter of principles
that served, even when it was not observed in detail, as a statement of
common objectives 1 7 2 There was in addition a "Memorandum for
European Markets" of 1930 that contained detailed quota arrangements and "as is" provisions with careful formulas governing the
admission of outsiders. 17 3 The memorandum was updated and
elaborated by the "Heads of Agreement for Distribution" in 1932,174
and was modified again in the "Draft Memorandum of Principles" in
1934.15 As in the steel cartels, the common theme was the
elimination of competitive infringements on members' markets. And
here, too, a Webb-Pomerene association (actually two) provided the
17 6
vehicle for enlisting United States producers in the world scheme.
Perhaps the most important similarity with the steel cartels, however,
was that this negative form of collaboration tended to break1 77
down
under the pressure of the unrestrained competition of outsiders.
(c) The Incandescent Electric Lamp Cartel.-The international
cartel in incandescent electric lamps possessed many of the attributes
of a private government. The agreement creating the cartel was signed
on December 23, 1924.178 The impetus appears to have been in part a
reaction to the relative price inelasticity of demand for lamps, and in
part to a desire by General Electric, which had an effective monopoly
in the United States market,1 79 to insure that its position would not be

170. Id. at 199. The agreement was named for Achnacarry Castle in England,
where the labors required in its formulation were spelled by intervals of grouse
shooting.
171. Id. at 200.
172. Id. at 210.
173. Id. at 228 et seq.
174. Id. at 241 et seq.
175. Id. at 253 et seq.
176. Id. at 218-28.
177. Id. at 210.
178. Id. at 331-32.
179. United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
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disrupted by foreign competition. 180 The cartel did not function by
fixing prices, but through an elaborate exchange of patent and
technical information, and by a division of markets.
The cartel was administered by a Swiss corporation, Phoebus, S.A.,
which was organized for that purpose. The members subscribed to the
stock in proportion to their lamp sales during a period from July 1,
1922 to June 30, 1923; their lamp sales during that period also
determined voting power in a general assembly that met twice a year.
An Administrative Board issued rules and regulations for applying the
terms of the agreement and was responsible for carrying out the
policies of the Assembly. A Board of Arbitration, consisting of a Swiss
law professor, a Swiss federal judge and "a technical expert on
international cartels," resolved disputes over patent claims, royalty
payments and the like.
The Administrative Board had four divisions: accounting, which
determined the allowable sales for each member under its quota; sales,
which administered price policies, cooperating with "national assemblies" in each area; propaganda, which sought to increase the use of
electric lamps and to promote sales of members' lamps over those of
noncartel members; and technical, which supervised the programs of
standardization and exchange of technical information.
The standardization and technical exchange program was used, with
astonishing cynicism, actually to reduce the life of some lamps for the
purpose of increasing sales.1"" The success of this policy, however,
conflicted with the quota arrangements
since the resulting sales
18 2
increases exceeded the quota levels.
The cartel made other contributions to inefficiency. The quota
system was enforced by the imposition of substantial penalties on
sales in excess of the alloted quotas; the proceeds from the penalties
were distributed to those members that undersold their quotas. 8 3 The
system provided a subsidy for weaker firms threatened with bankruptcy. The cartel simply assigned them larger quotas than they could
fulfill, and then paid them a share of the penalties for the shortages. 184
Competitors of the cartel were treated less charitably. Phoebus,

180. The following description is based on G. STOCKING & M. WATKINS,
supra note 146, at 325-26, 332-35.
181. United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 896-99 (D.N.J.
1949); C. EDWARDS, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CARTELS, supra

note 153, at 16-18; G.

supra note 146, at 353-55.
182. G. STOCKING & M.
183. Id. at 337.
184. Id. at 352.

WATKINS,

STOCKING &

M.

WATKINS,

supra note 146, at 354-55.
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outside the United States, fought nonmembers wherever they arose by
advertising its members' products, and even by setting up "fighting
In this practice we see the
companies" to drive out the competition.'
predatory side of the cartel, as contrasted to the weaknesses evident in
the examples thus far.
Ironically, the one source of successful competitive discipline
against this cartel came from Japan, and from the noncartelized
portion of the Japanese industry. The largest Japanese producer (in
which General Electric owned a 40 per cent interest) was a member of
the cartel, but the numerous small Japanese producers, operating with
low labor costs and at a favorable exchange rate, carved out a growing
share of the world export market and forced General Electric to
respond by offering cheaper lamps and reducing the price of Christmas
tree lights.' 8 6 Significantly, this competitive upsurge was not unleashed until the expiration of two major patents.'
The lamp cartel is also instructive on the possibility of separating
restrictive behavior abroad from some carryover into the domestic
market."8 8 General Electric's affiliation with the cartel reportedly was
executed through a wholly owned subsidiary incorporated in Britain
and through local subsidiaries in Brazil, China and Mexico." 9 Stocking
and Watkins contend that
[i]t goes virtually without saying that General Electric adjusted its
operations to the cartel program. Nor were the express commitments of
these subsidiaries the only ties binding General Electric to Phoebus. By
separate contractual arrangements between International, its subsidiary,
which is an American corporation, and the principal cartel members,
General Electric had woven its operations into the cartel pattern as
effectively as though it were an outright member.19
The district court's decision in the Lamp case, in effect, confirmed
this conclusion by its finding that the network of foreign licenses had

185. Id. at 353.
186. Id. at 34649. Stocking and Watkins state that of 310 factories producing
incandescent lamps in Japan in 1933, only 12 employed more than 100 workers
and more than 250 employed fewer than 30 each. Eleven firms formed a domestic
cartel in 1933 but the great majority of the 298 smaller factories did not belong.
Id.
187. Id. at 346.
188. See notes 228-30 infra. This argument was also made during the debates
on the Webb Act. H.R. REP. No. 50, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-8 (1917). See, e.g.,
1972 Hearings,supra note 145, at 235.
189. G.STOCKING & M. WATKINS, supra note 146, at 337-38.
190. Id. at 337.
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interest of
the purpose and effect of dividing markets "to reduce
' 19 1
potential foreign competition in United States trade."
Appraised in terms of its impact on export trade, the lamp cartel
had little to commend it. By dividing markets, it tended both to
exclude imports and to inhibit American exports. The system of fines
for sales in excess of quota limits was an obvious disincentive to
export. And, in yet a further irony, the high monopoly price in the
United States served as a magnet for Japanese imports, which were
92
excluded from most other countries by quota restrictions.
(d) The Chilean Nitrate Cartel.-The foregoing examples of the
classic cartels contained horizontal agreements between private firms
in different countries, though in the case of steel, the private
agreements were accompanied by some government involvement.
Another variation is possible when a single country has monopoly
control over a commodity and the government cartelizes its domestic
industry. This variation occurred in Chilean nitrates, with highly
instructive results.
Chile had a monopoly of the world's source of natural nitrates; the
monopoly provided a major source of Chile's national revenues for
half a century, from 1880 to 1930.193 The nitrate deposits were easily
developed, and the Government at first permitted unlimited entry to
the deposits by auctioning off blocks of land to private bidders.
Production soon outran even rapidly growing demand and the Chilean
Government cooperated with private schemes to cartelize the industry, while maintaining a high export tax to exploit its monopoly
position. The cartelization consisted of an apportionment of quotas
for the available demand among all producers on a pro rata basis; there
were penalties for exceeding quotas.
All export sales were made through the Chilean Nitrate Producers'
Association, which was organized in 1919 with the support of the
Government. Quotas were salable and some producers apparently were
able to shut their plants and receive an income from the sale of their
continuing quota allocations. Since quotas were prorated among all
producers, new entrants reduced the share of existing producers; since
quotas could not be increased by increasing production, there was no
incentive for the development of technology, which stagnated.
The high price extracted by Chile for its monopoly supply of
natural nitrates, with the desire of foreign governments to avoid

191. United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 847 (D.N.J.
1949).
192. G. STOCKING & M. WATKINS, supra note 146, at 346.
193. The following description is based on id. at 120-39.
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dependence on a foreign source for this important war material, led to
widespread development of synthetic sources. A world "nitrogen
rush" in the years 1926-1934 ensued, breaking the Chilean monopoly
and permanently diminishing Chile's foreign revenues.
(e) The Organizationof Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).Perhaps the most ambitious of the export cartels is OPEC, the
intergovernmental cartel established by major oil exporting countries.
This group is too new to permit judgments concerning its long-term
effectiveness, but it clearly has succeeded thus far in its efforts to
increase prices.19 4 The experience of the Chilean nitrate cartel, which
drove consumers to develop alternative, synthetic sources, may suggest
a parallel
should OPEC remain successful in artificially raising
195
prices.
One result of OPEC has been the formation of a joint bargaining
position by the international oil companies. Since the subject matter
of the agreement is imports, not exports, the Webb-Pomerene Act is
inapplicable, but the companies have utilized the Justice Department's
to conform the legality of their
standard business review procedure 196
actions to the current antitrust laws.
(f)

Characteristicsof the Classic Cartels.-The foregoing examples

reveal that there is nothing inherent in the nature of cartels that
strengthens either the ability or the propensity of their members to
export. Businessmen, when relieved of the rules enforcing competition, generally tend to become not more aggressive, but less so. Their

194. For two conflicting views on the past and future of OPEC see Akins, The
Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf Is Here, 51 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 463 (1973), and
Adelman, Is The Oil Shortage Real?, 1972-1973 (Winter) FOREIGN POLICY 69.
195. Vast sources of synthetic crude are available in shale and coal, for
example, which were not economical to develop at previous world price levels. See
CABINET TASK FORCE ON OIL IMPORT CONTROL, REPORT ON THE OIL

246, at 54, app. J, at 303-04 (1970).
IMPORT QUESTION
196. The role of the Department's business review procedure (28 C.F.R. §
50.6) was explained as follows by former Assistant Attorney General McLaren in

reply to a letter from Sen. Proxmire, as reported in PLATT's

OILGRAM,

March 9,

1971, at 3: "The Department of Justice does not have power to grant immunity
to anyone for a violation of the antitrust laws or for violations of a court decree.
What we can do is state our present enforcement intentions based on
representations that are made to us as to a course of conduct then proposed to be
undertaken. This is our standard business review procedure.
"Before we can conclude that a violation of the antitrust laws may occur, there
must be 'evidence of a substantial and adverse impact on the domestic or foreign
trade of the United States.' When a proposed course of action described to us
would not, in our opinion, have such an effect, a business review letter is
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common reaction to competition abroad is to arrive at a truce with
their foreign competitors-normally accomplished by an agreement
either to stay out of each other's markets altogether or to set firm
limits on the extent of interpenetration. The high prices and restricted
output that result tend to make collaborating enterprises more, not
less, vulnerable to competition. And the cartel practices of exporting
countries that have sought to maximize prices tend to alienate their
import customers, who must then seek alternative sources. Viewed as
a device for preserving and enlarging its export markets, the Chilean
nitrate cartel was a complete disaster.
The success of cartelization is precarious and dependent on almost
complete control of the market; even small increments of competitive
supply can raise havoc with the tightest of cartels. 197 At the same
time, cartels sometimes behave in a way that threatens competing
nonmembers. Price discrimination and "fighting companies" are
serious predatory threats that must be recognized. There are specific
legal remedies for these practices, however, including antidumping
laws,1 98 exclusion orders for unfair trade practices, 99 countervailing
duties, 200 antitrust and unfair competition laws generally and legislatively imposed tariffs and quotas. And as the OPEC development
indicates, the antitrust laws allow sufficient flexibility, wholly apart
from Webb-Pomerene, to accommodate whatever measures are reasonably necessary to counter monopolistic practices abroad. In the cartels
described as the classic type, their negative, handicapping effects
appear to have been predominant. Another type of cartel, however,
poses very definite threats to competing nonmembers and has been

appropriate. But the matter does not rest there. At an appropriate time we may
require full information on what was in fact done under the clearance given, and
all business review applicants are on notice of this.
"[T] he reported activities of the companies involve a joint effort on the part of
both large and small to assure that the concerted approach of the producing
countries will not work to the greater prejudice of some competitors-especially
the smaller ones-than to others. Faced with this combination of oil producing
countries, demanding higher fees in the form of taxes or royalties, the companies'
actions of which we are aware represent no more than a countervailing force to
minimize the adverse price effect on consumers . ... "
197. Cartel agreements have provided escape clauses based on the per centage
of the total market outside cartel control, with the limit set as low as five percent.
See G. STOCKING & M. WATKINS, supra note 12, at 96-97.
198. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1970); 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
199. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970).
200. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
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emphasized in arguments stressing the difficulties of competing
abroad-what might be termed the "aggressive cartels."
3. The Aggressive Cartels.-A purpose to drive out or foreclose
competitors, in contrast to the live-and-let-live philosophy of the
classic cartels, is distinctive of the aggressive cartels. The archetypes
were the German and Japanese pre-World War II chemical cartels."r
Other members of the chemical cartels tended to behave in the pattern
of the classic cartels; but their interaction with the more aggressive
members is integral to the story of the latter members. Here again, we
encounter both private and governmental involvement.
The aggressive cartels noted here were highly interconnected across
industry lines. I. G. Farbenindustrie A.G. (I.G.), the German combine,
was a competitor of duPont in chemicals, of Standard Oil in synthetic
rubber and of Dow Chemical and Alcoa in magnesium. I.G.'s
aggressive role was a matter of governmental policy. The German
Government identified the entire field of chemistry as "the wave of
the future" and sought to harness the industry to its own special
objectives.2" 2 I.G. was the vehicle for implementing this policy and its
success was considerable. As Stocking and Watkins stated:
Possessing superior technical resources and a head start in several directions
over other producers, benefiting also from greater governmental assistance,
I.G. has been unwilling to merge its interests in a genuine, equal partnership
with any other company. Instead, it has tried to use its advantages to
achieve comprehensive international dominion in the chemical realm.... A
shrewd bargainer, with strong nationalistic interests, I.G. has played the
game of cartelization not merely as a way of living with its business rivals,
but as a means of supervising, circumscribing, and, wherever possible,
controlling their activities. It has used cartel agreements as instruments of
economic aggression. 20 3
By contrast, the American and British firms reacted in the classic
tradition of cartel behavior:
I.G. and the Japanese chemical manufacturers were often brusque, quick to
take offense at real or fancied transgressions by others.... DuPont and ICI,
on the other hand, were generally conciliatory and polite; their tactics were
often defensive and conservative, their policy one of appeasement....
201. Much of the same attitude was reflected in the German steel industry.
See G. STOCKING & M. WATKINS, supra note 146, at 212-14. But in steel a
comparable drive by other governments on behalf of their own industries did not
permit the Germans to dominate in steel as they did in chemicals, and they were
thus forced into the more compromising pattern of the classic cartels. Id. at 211.
202. Id. at 373-74.
203. Id. at 466.
204. Id. at 423.
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Synthetic rubber provides a case in point. I.G. was the world leader
in synthetic rubber technology. (The technological effort was subsidized by the German Government, which sought to extend its
monopolistic position abroad.2"') DuPont, I.G.'s obvious American
counterpart, was not eager to restrict its own promising development
in this field,2" 6 but Standard Oil of New Jersey was a more willing
partner for I.G. Standard had an interest in keeping I.G. out of the oil
business, in which I.G. had developed potentially important technology in the hydrogenation of coal."' The companies concluded a
series of agreements on November 9, 1929, based on a division of
fields: Standard would stay out of chemicals except as that industry
might affect oil. The agreements also called for close cooperation
between Standard Oil and I.G.2" 8 This spirit of cooperation extended
to the accommodation of I.G.'s objective of holding back American
progress in synthetic rubber development because of that product's
strategic importance?"° Standard reportedly delayed at I.G.'s request
a synthetic rubber project that it was undertaking in cooperation with
other companies, even though the delay was not required by their
written agreements.21 0 Standard also followed a restrictive licensing
policy toward American rubber companies, confining license use to
high-priced specialties only, in fulfillment of Standard's obligation to
I.G. to respect DuPont's vested interest in the synthetic rubber
market. 21r The consequence was a laggard synthetic rubber industry at
the outbreak of World War II, when the attack on Pearl Harbor cut off
95 per cent of the United States' crude rubber supplies.2 12
Standard Oil later sought to justify the restraint by claiming that
2 13
the agreements with I.G. provided certain patents and know-how.
Since this rationale has been criticized on the ground that the
technology might have been available otherwise,21 4 the more basic
question would appear to be whether the decision to make this kind
of trade-off should be left to private business. Standard had a
self-interest in eliminating competition with I.G. in petroleum. 215 That

205. Id. at 90.
206. Id. at 90-91.
207. Id. at 90-93.
208. Id. at 93-94.
209. Id. at 97-98.
210. Id. at 101.
211. Id. at 105-106.
212. Id. at 56, 92.
213. Id. at 98.
214. Id. at 98,498-99.
215. The Department of Justice sued to break up the Standard-IG agreements,
which resulted in a plea of nolo contendere and a consent decree. Id. at 106.
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self-interest may have loomed larger in the company's eyes than the
natural interest in the development of a synthetic rubber industry.2 16
A similar subordination of United States interests occurred in
magnesium. Alcoa had a minor interest in magnesium but its primary
interest was in aluminum, with which magnesium competes in some
respects.2 1 A joint venture between Alcoa and I.G. limited Alcoa's use
of the technology it received to the United States, thus effectively
excluding Alcoa from foreign markets;2 1 this circumstance was
reinforced by a specific cartel agreement not to compete with I.G. in
Europe.21 9 Alcoa also sold to I.G. at discriminatorily lower prices than
to its American customers; an arrangement that both supplied the
German rearmament program 220 and contributed to retard the
development of the war-related magnesium industry in the United
States.22 1
The supervening interests of the German Government pursuing
policies outside the commercial realm distinguished the cartel arrangements in synthetic rubber, chemicals generally and magnesium from
the classic cartels. In all other respects, these cartels fit the classic
pattern of market division and peaceful coexistence. And the
cartelized performance of American firms when faced with aggressive
state-supported cartels-so often emphasized as a principal reason for
an export exemption-was the worst of all. Left to its own devices,
private business showed neither the inclination nor the ability to
counteract the aggressive policies of its foreign counterparts. And the
conglomerate nature of the I.G. combine effectively precluded the
formation of any domestic combination to offset it. So while it may
well be that aggressive cartels abroad require policies different from
the normal competitive rules applied in our domestic markets, it is far
216. The box score on Standard's dealings with IG is less than comforting:
"So far as synthetic rubber developments are concerned, the Americans gave the
fruits of American technical programs, such as they were, to their German cartel
partner but received only empty promises and barren patent specifications in
return." Id. at 117 (footnote omitted). "The men with whom they [Standard's
representatives] dealt were not simon-pure businessmen, like themselves, intent
predominantly on advancing their private interests. A totalitarian state in
Germany had effectively subordinated private business interests to its aggressive
nationalistic designs. Standard's German partner was, in fact if not in law, an arm
of the state, and was deliberately used as an instrument of economic warfare." Id.
at 116-17 (footnote omitted).
217. Id. at 278.
218. Id. at 290.
219. Id. at 299.
220. Id. at 300.
221. Id. at 300, 303.
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from clear that merely freeing American firms to deal as they like with
such foreign interests is the best-or even a defensible-means of
coping with the problem.
C. Can Competition Work in InternationalTrade?
The experience with international cartelization hardly commends it
as a model for the formulation of economic policy in the future. The
only instances in which national objectives appear to have been
significantly advanced were the unusual cases in which the cartel was
itself an instrument of state policy. National policy implemented in
that manner readily can be frustrated through countermeasures by the
governments of importing countries.2 2 2 Left free to pursue their own
interests, businessmen consistently place a higher value on avoiding
competition and preserving existing investments than on increasing
exports or otherwise serving national interests. The devices that
businessmen have employed-quota arrangements with penalties for
overproduction and rewards for underproduction, restrictive technology licensing arrangements that fence off national markets and
undertakings to avoid competition-tend to increase costs and to
impede technological progress.
The justifications offered in support of these practices are quite
plausible and sometimes even valid. Faced with an aggressive,
state-supported cartel, or with the special requirements of a state
trading company for projects of a size or orders in quantities
exceeding the capacities of individual firms,2 2 3 the formation of
foreign consortia to reduce bidding costs on construction contracts,2 2 4
for example, are reasonable factors to be considered in determining
what kinds of competitive conduct should be allowed. Factors
peculiar to certain industries also tend to impair the efficiency of
competition as a regulator of supply and demand, in either domestic
or international trade. Agricultural production, for example, may be
unresponsive in the short run to changes in price;22 the magnitude of
investments needed for some industrial 2 6 and natural resource
222. Antidumping sanctions, exclusion orders under § 337 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, countervailing duties and resort to tariff or quota legislation are among
the obvious measures of retaliation. This factor was cited as one of the problems
leading to the sugar cartel. See id. at 26-27.
223. 1972 Hearings,supra note 145, at 368-70.
224. See, e.g., id. at 375, 376 & 381; 1916 Hearings,supra note 78, at 4.
225. This argument frequently is made with respect to chemical plants. See G.
STOCKING & M. WATKINS, supra note 146, at 400-01.
226. See, e.g., id. at 364-65.
Spring, 1973

EXPORTS AND ANTITRUST

projects2 2 may justify resort to some regulatory devices other than
the uninhibited working of the marketplace. (Coincidentally, industries in which such conditions occur often are actively involved in
international trade.) But it does not follow that the solution is simply
to remove the rules against restraints of competition. To do so is to
treat export trade as an isolatable segment of commerce. Students of
competition long have contended that it is impossible (at least as a
general rule) to maintain partly cartelized and partly competitive
interrelated domestic and international markets 2 International cartel
schemes in the past typically have been extensions of domestic
monopolies, and it has been argued that an international control
scheme is unworkable without complementary controls in domestic
markets.229 To require that businessmen adhere to different and
inconsistent patterns of behavior in the domestic and international
sales of the same products and services is asking too much.23
In each of these situations there is some element of choice. Some
alternatives will meet the problem without undue prejudice to
competition, others will impair it more than necessary; almost surely
there will be others that do nothing but eliminate competition. The
indicated need is a mechanism to replace the present universal
exemption of export trade with a flexible application of the normal
rules of competition.
III. A

WORKABLE REGIME FOR EXPORTS:

IMMUNITY VERSUS THE RULE OF REASON

A.

When Is a CartelNot a Cartel?

Justice Frankfurter observed that "cartel" is not a talismanic
word. 231 In American usage it has been used to define arrangements
among producers to limit competition between them, generally

227. See, e.g., id. at 216.
228. See, e.g., id. at 29; Testimony of Donald F. Turner in 1967 Hearings,
supra note 138, at 124.
229. G. STOCKING & M. WATKINS, supra note 146, at 184 (steel), 222
(aluminum), 304-05, 325-26 (lamps).
230. The Webb Act sought to meet this problem by requiring that the
association engage solely in export trade, the theory being that different people
would be involved. But this proved unrealistic (as some foresaw), since wholly
owned subsidiaries in whatever form have their policies set by the same
management as the parent company. G. STOCKING & M. WATKINS, supra note
146, at 255-56 (aluminum), 328-29, 337-38 (lamps); 1917 Hearings, supra note
73, at 73-75.
231. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 605 (1951).
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referring to international marketing arrangements.2 32 In Japan and
Germany, however, the negative connotation that we give the concept
practices described in the
does not appear; the Japanese term includes
233
United States merely as oligopolistic.
Many joint activities do not fit the traditional American idea of
cartels and do not violate the antitrust laws. Jointly owned facilities or
service agencies are obvious examples (provided that fair access is
available if any such common agency acquires monopoly characteristics).23 4 The list of joint activities delineated in the Japanese
Export and Import Trading Act for the most part would not
necessarily involve Sherman Act violations. 3 The joint activity
envisaged by the Webb-Pomerene Act-joint selling agencies for
exports-arguably is not necessarily violative of the antitrust laws even
in the absence of an immunity statute.2 3 6 Indeed, as former Assistant
Attorney General Turner has pointed out, the kinds of activity made
permissible by the Webb Act that would not have been permissible
without it-e.g., price fixing and division of markets-more likely
inhibit than promote exports.2 37
The above sampling from the historical experience with cartels
manifests that the mere existence of cartel arrangements abroad
implies no necessary disadvantage for American exporters. Likewise,
permitting restrictive activity by our own firms is no assurance that
exports will be promoted. Some of the experience with early Webb
associations demonstrates that they had exactly the opposite effect.
The arguments in support of the Webb Act, however, were characterized by indiscriminate references to cartels and cartel practices; no
real effort was exerted to distinguish between cartels that are

232. G. STOCKING & M. WATKINS, supra note 12, at 3. Significantly, the
term appears to have been derived from an old Latin word for a military truce.
For a detailed history of the usage of the word "cartel" see E. HEXNER,
INTERNATIONAL CARTELS

3-42 (1946).

233. For a discussion of the usage of the term under Japanese law see E.
HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN 358-89 (1970).
234. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). See also Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963), which emphasized that there is a special
obligation to be fair and objective where concerted action may harm some
competitors.
235. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.

236. See, e.g., note 121 supra; FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 64, at 7;
1972 Hearings,supra note 145, at 809; 1967 Hearings, note 138 supra.
237. See 1967 Hearings, supra note 138, at 125. This is confirmed by
experience. The Webb association for potash set export prices at a level that made
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predatory, inhibitory of the members' own competitiveness or
neutral. 238 This indiscriminate approach was carried over into the
Webb Act itself, which contains no criteria to distinguish between
constructive and unnecessarily restrictive behavior so long as the
association's activities are confined to export trade.23 9 Also, neither
the FTC nor the Attorney General was authorized to differentiate
constructive from needlessly restrictive practices.
In sum, a wide range of possible joint activity in export trade, from
the helpful and legal to the counterproductive and illegal (absent the
statutory immunity), are lumped together without distinction in the
Webb Act's immunity bath. The asserted need for across-the-board
immunity is the elimination of uncertainty. There is obvious merit in
the argument that if legality is to be measured by a rule of reason that
might sanction some activities in export trade that would not be
permitted domestically, there should be some way of deciding
beforehand whether a proposed activity is legal. Immunity is one way
of doing this. Another technique would be implementation of ad hoc
procedures that could provide assurances of legality on a case by case
basis. Businessmen traditionally have favored immunity. But should
they?

it advantageous for members to sell outside the association to meet competition
from low cost Canadian production. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 64, at
65. Experience also tends to show that Webb associations do not offer superior
administrative advantages to export brokers or trading companies, and that the
latter are a more effective way of promoting exports. In the Webb Act hearings,
for example, one such broker who did substantial export business in textiles,
where there are hundreds of U.S. firms, testified that "... . no foreign selling
corporation could represent successfully a very large number of competing
concerns. It could not make good for them. It might represent one or two or
three; in certain lines it could represent a dozen, but it could not represent the
entire industry and make good for it." 1916 Hearings, supranote 78, at 55. The
FTC Staff Report notes the generally successful use of export brokers and their
possible advantages over Webb associations. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 64,
at 7. The Report also observed that a number of Webb associations were scaled
down from fully functioning export houses to administrative service organizations
because the members found that they could do better selling individually. Id. at
27, 29. It further found that among active associations, those which function like
joint selling agents represent firms with dominant domestic and world market
positions-which would be fully capable of exporting on their own. Id. at 33.
238. See generally notes 119, 120 & 123-24 supra.
239. Section 4 of the Webb Act, which bars unfair acts, may afford some
protection as between cooperating exporters-where it is least needed-but does
not extend antitrust rules to export trade. See note 84 supra.
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B. The Illusory Quest for Immunity
The difference between immunity and the rule of reason is that the
former permits activity that would otherwise violate the law, while the
latter permits a conclusion that, under the circumstances, the law is
not violated. The immunity, if it is not to repeal the antitrust laws
entirely, must have some strict bounds on its scope. The risk of
overstepping these bounds may be just as great as the risk of
misjudging what conduct is permissible under the rule of reason.
Because immunity is antithetical to the antitrust law itself, enforcement of the limitations on its scope will necessarily be very strict.
The second risk is that resort to immunity carries no presumption
that the activity otherwise would be legal, and may well imply the
contrary. This facilitates the drafting of complaints. Nearly all that a
treble damage plaintiff need allege to survive a motion for summary
judgment is that the defendant's activities exceeded the scope of the
immunity. The fact that the activities were joint and that immunity
was sought may be sufficient in many cases to raise an issue of fact. 4
The alternative to immunity-an advisory opinion from the FTC or
a business review clearance from the Department of Justice-provides
a law enforcement official's view that no violation of law is involved.
Common sense indicates that prospective plaintiffs would be much
less tempted to sue when confronted with such a prima facie
indication of legality than with the opposite implication of a grant of
immunity.
One of the reasons cited for the general neglect of the Webb Act is
that using it carries the risk of a violation.2 4 ' What seems not to have
been recognized is that this is inevitable as long as the Act's protection
is in the form of immunity.

C.

Two Options Under the Rule of Reason

1. The Business Review Procedure and FTC Advisory Opinions.Antitrust officials have urged businessmen who believe that opportunities in foreign business are denied them for antitrust reasons to
submit their proposals under the Justice Department's business review

240. Summary judgment was denied in such a suit alleging that immune
cooperation in tanker use among oil companies during the Suez Crisis of 1956
extended beyond the period of applicable immunity. Oceanic Petroleum Carriers,
Inc. v. The Atlantic Refining Co. (S.D.N.Y. Civ. Action No. 150-162, Nov. 4,
1963) (memorandum opinion of Judge Dawson, not reported).
241. See, e.g., 1972 Hearings,supra note 145, at 548.
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procedure.242 This is a procedure used routinely in domestic cases but
infrequently in foreign trade. While no immunity attaches to such a
clearance, or to an FTC advisory opinion,2 43 both are commonly and
successfully relied on in practice. Many fears cited in congressional
hearings may be groundless, or mollified easily by adjustments in the
specifics of a proposal.24 4
Since the business review procedure inquiry is under the rule of
reason, the limitations of the Webb Act are not controlling. Foreign
investment projects and licensing arrangements, for example, are
excluded from Webb Act coverage, but if not unnecessarily restrictive,
they can be cleared by Justice and FTC procedures. The same would
be true of arrangements including foreign entities, or having some
impact on domestic prices.
These procedures provide the flexibility needed to separate the
valid needs of foreign business from restrictions that are unnecessary,
undesirable and even counterproductive. There is a range of choices
available in most transactions, and it is common for an initial proposal
to contain (or omit to include) features that can be changed to both
the legal and business advantage of the proposal. The failure to
consider such modifications when a proposal is still in an early
planning stage may, in fact, account for some of the asserted tendency
to abandon proposals on antitrust grounds. More frequent resort to
these consultative procedures could go far toward removing the
uncertainty complained of in foreign transactions and could prove
superior to the sometimes treacherous immunity of the Webb Act.
2. An Administrative Alternative.-The existing Justice and FTC
procedures fall short of legal certainty, and the Justice business review
procedure does not yield reasoned explanations of the Department's

242. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6. See remarks by Donald I. Baker, Director of Policy
Planning, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, at the New York State Bar
Association Meeting, January 24, 1973, 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
50,161
(1973); Remarks by Keith I. Clearwaters, Special Assistant to the Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, to the Association
of General Counsel, 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
50,169 (1973); Testimony of
former Deputy Assistant Attorney General Walker B. Comegys, 1972 Hearings,
supra note 145, at 811 (reprinted with case examples); 5 CCH TRADE REG.
REP.
50,129 (1973). See also note 196 supra.
243. See 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 9801-.01 to -.04 (1972).
244. See, e.g., 1972 Hearings,supra note 145, at 809. The FTC legal expert
who testified in the Webb hearings remarked that: "There is a very curious state
of mind on the part of businessmen of the country. They seem to believe that the
Sherman law is actually more restrictive in regard to foreign trade than it is in
regard to domestic trade." 1916 Hearings,supra note 78, at 36.
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rationale that can be cumulated into an instructive body of precedents. These additional advantages could be provided by conversion
to a system like the negative clearance procedures under article 85(3)
of the European Economic Community. The European Economic
Community Commission's action, unlike the opinions of the Department of Justice and the FTC, has legal effect.24 The systematic
processing of applications and publication of the rationales for
decisions promotes a growing body of jurisprudence that contributes
to predictability and certainty.2 4 6
Like the rule of reason, a procedure like the negative clearance has
built-in requirements to assure that restrictive measures do not exceed
legitimate needs, and that consumers receive some share of the
benefits.2 4 7 A comparable procedure could be adopted in the United
States by legislation replacing the Webb-Pomerene Act. If this is done,
some provision should be made for continuing supervision by the
administrative agency which should retain the power to revoke its
approval prospectively if abuses are discovered.2 4
IV. CONCLUSION

The purpose of the Webb-Pomerene Act to permit cooperative
export activities by eliminating uncertainty is consistent with the
objectives of the antitrust laws. The resort to a categorical grant of
immunity, however, has important defects. First, it fails to distinguish
between desirable and undesirable activities; secondly, it risks a
spillover of restrictive practices into the domestic market; thirdly, it
invites conflict with the new antitrust legislation of other nations (and
encourages foreign nations in turn to export restrictive practices to the
United States); and finally, it does little to promote exports because
of the rigidity inherent in any system of categorical immunity.
Perhaps the greatest disadvantage to the categorical grant of immunity
is that it tends to preempt other ways of dealing with export

245. EEC Comm'n Reg. No. 17, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2471 (1971).
246. See, e.g., id. at 2061 (digests of actions under article 85(3)). The group
exemptions that have arisen out of the many requests for individual exemptions
are a further example of the empirical evolution of rules through this process. See
EEC Comm'n Reg. No. 2821/71, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2729 (1973).
247. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
248. Advance information may be insufficient to appraise longer term actions.
The FTC urged that some form of supervision be retained as a safeguard. 1972
Hearings,supra note 145, at 238-39. The Administration bill would give the FTC
continuing supervisory'authority. See note 151 supra.
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problems, such as the consultative procedures of the Department of
Justice and the FTC.
The experience with international business behavior when free of
antitrust restraints demonstrates that exports tend to be inhibited
rather than expanded, and that aggressive behavior by state-supported
cartels is acquiesced in rather than resisted. Some form of governmental antitrust review, therefore, should be included in any special
regime for export trade. Legitimate export activities may be sanctioned under the rule of reason and uncertainty avoided either by the
consultative procedure of the Department of Justice and the FTC, or
by legislation that would substitute a new form of administrative
clearance for the Webb-Pomerene Act.
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